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Securing the Antecedent Debt of the Failing
Retail Merchant Under the Uniform
Commercial Code
When a wholesaler supplies inventory on open credit to a small retail
merchant, he relies on the merchant's credit rating, business acumen,
and current assets for assurance of payment.' So long as the merchant is
honest and his business successful, the open credit pattern of inventory
financing involves no great dangers for the supplier. The story changes
if the merchant's business begins to fail. Then the wholesaler must move
quickly to secure the debt or risk having his return reduced to a pro
rata share in the proceeds of an insolvency liquidation.
Securing the antecedent debt of a failing retail merchant has not
always been feasible, especially when the merchant's only valuable asset
was his inventory. Before the advent of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 2 the prevailing law of chattel security made it difficult, sometimes
impossible, for an insecure creditor to take a security interest in his
debtor's inventory. Many jurisdictions prohibited chattel mortgages in
1. P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSAaYIONS § 22.01 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as COOGAN]; see Lamey, How to Handle a Bulk Transfer, Symposium on A Practical
Approach to the Uniform Commercial Code for the Practicing Lawyer, 19 Bus. LAw. 67
(1963). Unsecured sales are frequent even though the security provisions of the Code
might be available. See also Schnader, The Unsecured Creditor-"The Little Businessman"
-And the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 B.C. IND. &: Cora. L. REv. 65, 66 (1959). Schnader
reports that in Philadelphia during the period from 1954 to 1959, the ratio of secured to
unsecured transactions remained relatively constant. He concludes that the availability of
the Code's simplified security system has not induced creditors to alter their financing
patterns. "[Bjy and large, the reasons motivating financial institutions, manufacturers and
other businessmen to extend unsecured credit, are the same under the Code as they were
previously." Id. 66. Predictably wholesalers will continue to sell on unsecured crcdit to
retail merchants, especially where the individual orders are small. The inconvenience of
negotiating and filing individual security agreements to cover each small inventory order
counts against a change in the unsecured credit pattern.
2. The Code was first enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953 and has been subsequently
enacted in 48 other states and in the District of Columbia. Louisiana is the exception. Sea
Hearings on S. 5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm, oil
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., insert, at 296 (1967). The 49th state to enact
the Code into law was Idaho, which did so during its 1967 legislative session, effective
January 1, 1968. For information on enactment and effectiveness and for alterationg of the
Official Text of the Code by each state, see UCC REP. SERv. (Current Materials 1968). All
citations to the Code in this Note are to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial
Code [hereinafter cited as UCC].
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inventory and others severely limited the scope of their protection a
Field pledges were permissible, but the cost and inconvenience of main-
taining possession adequate at law without denying the debtor easy
access to the pledged inventory often made that remedy impractical.4
Alternatively, the creditor could secure himself by taking a bulk sale
of the inventory.5 A bulk sale, however, was a harsh remedy almost cer-
tain to drive the debtor out of business.0 Yet, in all but the most extreme
circumstances, the law precluded inventory creditors from tailoring a
plan more fitting to their commercial needs.
By relaxing the common law's resistance to secured inventory financ-
ing,7 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code not only made small-
scale secured inventory financing possible, but also opened up new ways
to deal with the insecure creditor's plight. Under the Code the creditor
may take either a non-possessory, chattel mortgage-type security interest
in the inventory," or a possessory, pledge-type interest," to secure him-
self. Moreover, Article 9 permits a wholesaler to draw on a retail mer-
chant's inventory for collateral without policingI0 and without extend-
ing new value": as a condition of perfecting a security interest." Finally,
3. See, e.g., Mfixon v. Whitman, 279 Ala. 249, 258-59, 184 So. 2d 332, 339.41 (19G6);
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Clem, 220 Ark. 863, 865, 251 S.A.2d 112, 113 (1952);
General Credit Inc. v. Winchester, 196 Va. 711, 85 S.E.2d 201 (1955); Boile v. Finance &
Guar. Corp., 127 Va. 563, 569-70, 102 S.E. 591, 592-93 (1920). See also I G. GILM,,oRE, SEcru-
rTy INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 2.3-.5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GLMoaa]; Cohen
& Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COLUM. L REv. 1338 (1939); Gilmore & Axelrod.
Chattel Security: 1, 57 YALE L. J. 517, 534-38 (1948); Kripke & FeLsenfeld, Secured Trans.
actions: A Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniforn Commercial Code, 17 RurcEns
L. Rxv. 168, 182 (1962).
4. See generally Skilton, Field Warehousing as a Financing Device, 1961 WiS. I REV.
221, 229-40.
5. Ward & McGowen Grocery Co. v. Franklin, Stiles & Franklin, 18 Ala. App. 619, 93
So. 205 (1922); Sampson v. Brandon Grocery Co., 127 Ga. 454, 56 S.E. 488 (1907); Midland
Oil Co. v. Packers Motor Transp., 277 Ill. App. 451 (1934); Bailen v. E. P. Badger Import
Co., 99 Neb. 24, 154 N.W. 850 (1915); cf. Gorman v. Hellberg. 190 Iowa 728, 180 N.W. 732
(1921).
6. By definition a bulk transfer involves at least half of a merchant's inventory. UCC
§ 6-102; 2 CooGAN § 22.06(1)(c). In the antecedent debt context, the merchant receives no
cash from the transfer to buy new stock. Few merchants could suffer such a depletion in
inventory and survive.
7. The Code extends coverage to security interests in personal property, including
goods. UCC § 9-102(l)(a). In turn, § 9-109(4) classifies inventory as one type of good that
can be used as collateral. (See § 9-105(1)(c) for the definition of collateral.) Sections 9-204(3)
and 9-205 indicate the extent to which Article 9 has relaxed the common law restrictions
on secured inventory financing. UCC §§ 9-204, Comments 2-3; 9-205, Comments 1, 4.
8. UCC §§ 9-102(2), 9-205. See UCC § 9-203(1) & Comment 1.
9. UCC § 9-305 & Comments 1-2. See §§ 9-205, 9-207.
10. UCC § 9-205 8 Comments.
11. Article 9 does require new value in certain situations not here at isue. The per-
tinent Sections are: UCC §§ 9-107 (purchase money security interests), 9-103 (non-pref-
erential interests in after-acquired collateral), 9-304 (security interests in instrmnents or
negotiable documents), 9-307 (protection of buyers of goods). Cf. §§ 1-201(9), 9-303 (Eccurity
interests in chattel paper and non-negotiable instruments), 9-312(2) (priority of certain
interests in crops).
12. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966). UCC § 9-204(1) requires that value be
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Article 6 of the Code retains the bulk transfer as a third remedy.1a
Although the Code's expansion of remedies makes the law more re-
sponsive to the insecure creditor's commercial needs, none of the Code
devices is a panacea. Each has strengths the others lack, and each has
inherent limitations. A creditor faced with the problem of securing
himself against a failing debtor must weight carefully the advantages
and disadvantages of each device, at peril of ending in no better posi-
tion than a general creditor if he chooses incorrectly. Before deciding
on a device, then, the creditor should consider three broad problems:
How quickly must the interest be perfected in order to avoid subordina-
tion to competing claims? How much control over the collateral and its
proceeds is necessary? And how much cost and inconvenience is war.
ranted for securing the debt? To answer these questions he must take
into account the cause of the business crisis, whether the merchant can
survive it, and, if not, how rapidly insolvency is approaching.
The following hypothetical places the problem in context. A is a
household appliance dealer. When a discount department store with an
appliance department opens in a shopping center near A's store, A's
business begins to drop off. At the time A owes B, his major inventory
creditor, *4,000. He owes C, the rest of his creditors, a total of $3,000.14
A's inventory is worth approximately $6,500 wholesale. B discovers the
situation and decides to secure the $4,000 debt.
From the information given, B knows that A has enough inventory
in stock to pay off his debts if he can liquiddite at a profit, but he also
knows that the discount store has lured away A's customers. He cannot
tell, however, whether the customers will return after the novelty of the
discount store wears off, enabling A to survive the crisis. Furthermore,
he cannot tell whether A is already in default to C or whether A's
operating costs are rapidly driving him toward insolvency. The more
pessimistic B's prognosis of A's predicament, the more he will want
speedy perfection.',
given before a security interests can attach. However, the Code's definition of value is
extremely broad. UCC § 1-201(44). It includes both consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract and acquiring rights as security for a debt or obligation. I COoMAN § 4.05,
at 286; 1 GILMoRE § 11.5, at 352.
13. UCC § 6-107(2)(c).
14. C may be any of several types of creditor-e.g., another inventory supplier, a lend.
ing institution, a local utility, A's landlord, A's employees, the state or federal tax collector,
or a tort claimant.
15. The Code's "perfection" concept is derived from Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964). See 1 GILmoRE 435-37. An interest is "perfected" when a lien creditor
cannot acquire a interest in the collateral superior to that of the secured party. UCC §
9-301, Comment 1; see 3 W. CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.36, 60.39 (14th ed, 1967). Any of
the three devices under discussion confers a preference in behalf of the secured party
1548
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I. Speed of Perfection
A bulk transfer commends itself only when A's decline toward in-
solvency is gradual. Compliance with Article 6 is a time-consuming
process.16 After the parties have negotiated the details of the transfer,
they must compile a complete list of A's creditors"7 as well as a detailed
schedule of the merchandise to be transferred."' Notice must then be
sent to the other creditors,19 who are allowed ten days to investigate the
terms before the transfer can occur.20 During the interval between the
beginning of negotiations and the completion of the transfer, B has no
legal interest in the merchandise as against third parties other than that
of a general creditor. Anyone who has a judgment against A may levy on
the inventory without regard to the transaction under negotiation.
Furthermore, if A is in default on his obligation to C, C may attach the
inventory pending suit or, provided he qualifies, file notice of a statu-
tory lien on the property.2 ' Since A's business misfortunes will pre-
sumably affect his relations with creditors other than B, it is likely that
C will have an immediate right of action against A's assets, and the
Article 6 notice will be an invitation for him to press his claim.
Where A's operating expenses have become so out of proportion to
his income that he is rapidly approaching insolvency, the sluggish
which is potentially voidable under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. A security interest
may be voidable if taken on account of an antecedent debt while the debtor is inolvent
and perfected within four months of the debtor's adjudication as a bankrupt. See W.
CoL.um, supra, 60.07, 60.13. The only way that an insecure creditor can be certain of
avoiding the consequences of Section 60 is to employ a security device that can be per-
fected before the debtor becomes insolvent.
16. Article 6 has simplified the procedures prescribed in pre-Code bulk sales acts.
2 CooGAN § 22.03. Nonetheless, the procedures retained in Article 6 are still tortuous and
time-consuming. Id. § 22.10.
17. UCC §§ 6-104(1)(a), (2). Section 6-104(2) clearly indicates compiling tie required list
of creditors:
The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the transferor or his
agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all creditors of the trans-
feror, with the amounts when known, and also the names of all persons who are
known to the transferor to assert claims against him even though such claims are
disputed.
18. UCC § 6-104(l)(b). The Section requires that the schedule contain a description of
the inventory "sufficient to identify it," but does not set out the standard of sufficiency.
However, if the schedule is to serve its purpose-i.e., give creditors enough information to
make an intelligent judgment about the commercial soundness of the transaction-the
description must be detailed. It should indicate not only the quantity of the transfer-
the ratio of the amount of stock transferred to the total inventory-but also the quality
of the transfer-the ratio of the value of the stock transferred to the value of the total
inventory. Cf. 2 CooGAN §§ 22.06-.07, 22.10(4).
19. UCC §§ 6-105, 6-107. Section 6-107 sets out both a short and a long form of notice.
Since in the antecedent debt context the transferor receives no money to pay his other
creditors, the long form of notice must be used.
20. UCC § 6-105.
21. See note 14 supra.
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mechanics of a bulk transfer create an additional peril. If A becomes
insolvent before an Article 6 transaction is complete, the transfer could
constitute a voidable preference under section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act.2 Not only could C allege the preference as an act of bankruptcy
against A, 23 but A's bankruptcy trustee might well be able to set the
transfer aside, thereby destroying the benefit of B's security.2 4
Either Article 9 device exposes B to less risk from C's intervening
claim. Article 9 does not require that B put C on guard by actual notice
that he is securing himself-only constructive notice by public filing is
necessary.2 5 More important, filing notice usually completes the transfer
of a security interest.26 Without advance notice C is not likely to assert
his claim, and any intervention by him during the executory period
would be fortuitous.
The two methods available to a creditor under Article 9 do not, how-
ever, offer the same degree of protection against C's intervention. A
pledge-type interest, especially when it is structured in such a way that
A has ready access to the merchandise, takes longer to perfect than a
chattel mortgage-type interest. B would probably take the pledge of
inventory by setting up a field pledge in A's storeroom.27 Since B's tak-
ing possession of the collateral will not only affect the appearance of
A's store but will also limit the amount of his working inventory, A will
bargain to pledge as little of his inventory as possible. Unless B is will-
22. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
23. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C. § 21a (1964).
24. See note 15 supra.
25. UCC § 9-402 & Comment 2. Comment 2 states:
This Section adopts the system of "notice filing" which has proved successful under
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. What is required to be filed is not, as under chattel
mortgage and conditional sales acts, the security agreement itself, but only a simple
notice which may be filed before the security interest attaches or thereafter. The
notice itself indicates merely that the secured party who has filed may have a security
interest in the collateral described.
See generally 1 GamsoRE ch. 15.
26. UCC § 9-303 does allow the parties the option of filing the financing statement be.
fore the security interest attaches. Pre-attachment filing usually occurs in cases where a
financial institution agrees to loan a large sum and wants the giving of value, i.e., turning
over the money, to be the final step in the transaction. This is done to avoid the possibility
of a preference under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. See note 15 supra.
27. See p. 1547 supra. A field pledge rather than a field warehouse is suggested because
the latter involves formalities and expenses unnecessary to securing a relatively small In.
ventory debt. For example, a field warehouse requires the issuance and transfer of ware.
house receipts to control the collateral. These receipts must be issued by a licensed ware.
houseman. 1 GiLmoPRE § 6.2, at 151-54; Skilton, Field Warehousing as a Financing Dvicc,
1961 Wis. L. REv. 2 I, 240-57; Comment, Financing Inventory Through Field Varchousing,
69 YAt L. J. 663, 677-81 (1960). Since B can take actual possession of the collateral
through an agent (see UCC § 9-305, Comment 2), and can protect his interest by requir.
ing his agent to release inventory on A's payment of cash rather than on surrender of
warehouse receipts, the less formalistic and expensive field pledge device is adequate.
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ing to make ready concessions to A by undersecuring himself, the nego-
tiation period may also impede a speedy perfection against C.
Secondly, B will need time to convert the storeroom into a suitable
place for a field pledge. The amount of time consumed depends upon
the layout of the storeroom and upon the method by which B perfects
his interest-possession or filing. Article 9 permits both methods of
perfecting a pledge,- " but perfection by possession takes longer. If B
chooses to perfect by taking possession, he must comply with the pre-
Code formalities for establishing a valid field pledge,- 9 or risk C's at-
tacking the pledge as an unperfected security interest. 0 In addition, B's
interest is not perfected until the collateral is actually in the properly
structured storeroom: Article 9 rejects the old doctrine that related
possession back to the time at which the interest attached.3
Perfection by filing, though simpler, still does not avoid all the danger
of delay. Before a security interest attaches3- and is perfected,m the col-
lateral must be described in both the security agreement34 and the
financing statement;35 also, the description must be sufficient to identify
the collateral. 36 Were all of the inventory taken in pledge, a general
28. UCC § 9-305 & Comment 1. Section 9-305 provides in pertinent part that:
A security interest in ... goods ... may be perfected by the secured party's taking
possession of the collateral.... The security interest may be otherwise perfected as
provided in this Article before or after the period of possession by the secured part).
29. The last sentence of UCC § 9-205 provides: "This section does not relax the re-
quirements of possession where perfection of a security interest depends upon po.esion
of the collateral by the secured party or by a bailee." Section 9-205, Comment 6 indicates
that common law rules regarding requisite degree and extent of possession govern. The
common law required that the pledgee's possession be open, notorious, and inconsistent
with the pledgor's right of possession. See, e.g., American Pig Iron Storage Warrant Co.
v. German, 126 Ala. 194, 28 So. 603 (1900); First Nat'l Bank v. Caperton, 74 Miss. 857, 22
So. 60 (1897); Whiting v. Rubinstein, 7 Wash. 2d 204, 109 P.2d 312 (1941); Ackeron v.
Babcock, 132 Wash. 435, 232 P. 335 (19295); Hastings v. Lincoln Trust Co., 115 Wash. 492,
197 P. 627 (1921).
30. See UCC §§ 9-205, Comment 6, 9-205; Comment 3; cf. UCC § 9-301.
31. UCC § 9-305 & Comment 3.
32. See UCC § 9-204(1) which provides:
A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection (3) of Section
1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the collateral. It
attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken place unless
explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
The moment of attachment marks the time at which the security agreement becomes
binding between the secured party and the debtor. See UCC § 9-204, Comment 1.
33. See note 15 supra.
34. UCC § 9-203(l)(b) provides in pertinent part that:
[A] security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless
(b) the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral .... In describing collateral, the word "proceeds" is sufficient without fur-
ther description to cover proceeds of any character.
35. UCC § 9-402(l) & Comment I.
36. UCc § 9-110. The Comment to Section 9-110 states:
The test of suficiency of a description laid down by this Section is that the description
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description such as "all the merchandise located in A's store" would
qualify.37 B could not take a pledge of the whole lot, however, unless
his claim against A were large enough to justify it.38 Consequently, in
most cases, B and A must describe the collateral pledged with reasonable
particularity or limit it to "all the merchandise in the storeroom of A's
store." By the latter method, B's interest could not attach, and thus
could not be perfected, until he had segregated the collateral and moved
it into the storeroom.
39
When B needs the advantage of speedy perfection either to protect
himself against C's claim or to guarantee perfection before A becomes
insolvent, he will usually have to content himself with a non-possessory
or chattel mortgage-type interest. The negotiation of a chattel mort-
gage is the least time-consuming, since it in no way disrupts the ap-
pearance of A's business and requires only minimal participation by A
in the formalities of perfection, Nor is there anything fraudulent in
B's interest covering all of the inventory,40 eliminating the necessity of
a detailed inventory of A's stock to prepare a sufficient description of
the collateral. In addition A would not have to furnish a complete
schedule of his creditors as he would if the parties attempted a bulk
transfer.4
1
Compliance with the technical requirements for perfecting a chattel
mortgage also demands less of B's time. One of the attachment require-
ments is already present: A's rights in the collateral, his inventory.'2"
A second condition for attachment occurs automatically: B gives value
adequate under the Code to support the interest merely by agreeing
do the job assigned to it-that it make possible the identification of the thing ded.
cribed.
37. Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 282,
233 & cases cited at n. 9 (1965). See Thomson v. O.M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. D. S. C.2d
85, 87 (1962) ("The inventory, furniture and fixtures of debtors [sic) business'); Girard
Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 13 Pa. D, & C.2d 119, 127 (1957)
("We, a dealer in a passenger and commercial automobiles (herein called merchandise)
38. There are two reasons for this. First, if B took all the inventory in pledge, A would
lose all the working stock he needs to get money with which he could redeem additional
inventory. In other words, taking all the inventory would defeat the purpose of the device.
Second, depriving A of all his stock would probably render him insolvent and thereby
make the pledge vulnerable as a fraudulent conveyance under Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(b),
11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(b) (1964). See 4 W. CoLIR, BANKRurcY 67.35 (14th ed, 1967),
89. See p. 1551 supra.
40. A would not lose access to his inventory under the chattel mortgage device, so there
would be no problem under Bankruptcy Act § 67d, 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1964). Moreover,
C would not be prejudiced since B must turn over to him any surplus proceeds from a
liquidation of the collateral. UCC § 9-504(l)(c). See id. § 9-504, Comment 2.
41. See p. 1549 supra.
42, UCO § 9-204(1).
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to take security for the antecedent debt.4 3 All that remains is the
requirement that B reduce his agreement with A to writing14 and
file a financing statement.45 On completion of these relatively simple
steps, C can no longer acquire an interest in A's inventory superior to
B s.
46
II. Degree of Control
The need for speedy perfection, however, is not the sole factor deter-
mining the choice of a security device. B must also consider the degree
of control he must exercise over the collateral and the proceeds from its
liquidation in order to be sure of payment. Despite the perfection of
his interest, B may lose control over both the collateral and the proceeds
in certain situations, and the type of security interest he takes will affect
the amount of risk he assumes. The risk arises not only from C but
from A as well. C's threat is that he may disregard B's interest and either
enforce his claim against the inventory or pressure A into applying the
proceeds toward its reduction. The threat from A is that he will suc-
cumb to C's pressure, or otherwise put the collateral beyond B's reach.
None of these risks arise under a bulk transfer. That device transfers
direct control over both the inventory and its proceeds to B as soon as
the transaction is complete. A can no longer threaten B's interest by
wasting the proceeds before B's debt is paid; and since a bulk transfer,
unlike an Article 9 security interest,47 extinguishes A's equity in the
merchandise, the merchandise is no longer subject to levy by C. For
purposes of control the bulk transfer is the most advantageous device
for B.
Under a chattel mortgage-type security interest, on the other hand,
A retains ownership and possession of the collateral, and B has no right
to take the collateral until A defaults.48 In addition, A will regularly
dispose of the collateral in the ordinary course of his business, and the
proceeds will come into his, not B's, hands. Although B can exert a
measure of control over A's management of collateral by careful draft-
ing of the security agreement, the situation demands that B rely heavily
on A's good faith.
43. UCC § 9-204(1). See note 12 supra.
44. UCC §§ 9-203(l)(b), 9-204(1).
45. UCC §§ 9-502, 9-402.
46. UCC § 9-201. See id. §§ 9-301, 9-312(5) & Comment 4.
47. See UCC § 9-311 & Comment.
48. UCC § 9-503 & Comment. See 2 Gmm.omRE § 43.3, at 1191-94.
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For example, A's business crisis may become so acute that C threatens
to force an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. A may then begin di-
verting proceeds to C to forestall him. Article 9 allows B to negotiate a
security interest in the proceeds from A's sale of the collateral;'19 how-
ever, in order to enforce this interest, B must be able to trace and
specifically identify the proceeds.r0 Unless B has policed A's business
carefully, such tracing may be impossible and B's security will have
been reduced by the amount of the dissipated proceeds. Of course, B
can mitigate the risk by requiring, on penalty of default,' that A de-
posit all proceeds in a joint bank account, from which he can withdraw
them only on orders signed by both parties. The possibility remains,
however, that A will use the proceeds undetected to pay C without their
ever passing through the joint account.
Similarly A may dissipate the collateral itself. While an unauthorized
transfer of the inventory to C does not extinguish B's security interest
in the collateral 2 and B may sue C either in replevin or for conver-
sion,"3 B must identify the merchandise that C holds as the same col-
lateral covered by his security agreement with A in order to enforce
this right.54 Unless A cooperates in disclosing the whereabouts of C and
the transferred merchandise, B will probably be unable to trace the
collateral. Consequently, where B cannot trust A to respect the security
agreement when pressed by C, a chattel mortgage might prove im-
practical even though it permits a speedy perfection.
C also poses a more direct threat to a chattel mortgage interest: under
Section 9-311 he can levy on the collateral notwithstanding B's security
49. UCC § 9-203(l)(b). See id. §§ 9-306(3)(a ) , 9-402(3) 4.
50. UCC § 9-306(2). In interpreting Section 9-306 courts have rejected common law
"first-in-first-out" and "declining balance" rules. Under the Code B must be able to
identify the source of the proceeds he claims, i.e., to establish that they arose from sale of
collateral, Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (W.D. Pa. 1962),
and he must be able to identify the specific account into which the proceeds wele
deposited, In re C.E. Pontz & Son, Inc., 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 1131 (E.D. Pa. 1965), af'd inwi,,
359 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1966).
51. The Code's concept of default is not limited to the debtor's failure to make pay-
ments on the secured obligation. According to Gilmore, "[Djefault is, within reason, a
matter of contract and can best be defined as being whatever the security agreement says
it is." 2 Gimaolu § 43.3, at 1193. See Borochoff Properties, Inc. v. Howard Lumber Co.,
115 Ga. App. 691, 696, 155 S.E.2d 651, 654 (1967).
52. UCC § 9-306(2).
53. UCC § 9-306, Comment 3. See O.M. Scott Credit Corp. v. Apex, Inc., 97 R.I. '12,
198 A.2d 673 (1964) (replevin allowed).
54. Although UCC § 9-306's identification requirement applies only to proceeds,
identification of the collateral would still be necessary in order for B to succeed fit his
replevin action. See 46 AMr. JuR. Replevin § 80 (1943). Identification may be a particularly
difficult problem where A's inventory consists of small common-brand items which carry
no serial numbers or other identifying marks and whicl are easily commingled with
similar stock.
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interest in it. 5 How much trouble C can cause B by levying is unclear.
Section 9-311 suggests that C can reach only A's equity, but it fails to
define the procedure by which the competing parties can reconcile their
interests.5 G Of central importance is whether B or C controls the liqui-
dation of the collateral and, if C, whether the default provisions of the
Code govern.57 Unless B can prevent C from forcing a sheriff's sale, he
will either have to pay off C's claim to preserve the collateral or rest
content with his priority in the sale proceeds. C's levy indicates that A
is in trouble, and B may only throw good money after bad by paying
C off. On the other hand, a priority in the proceeds of the sale may be
worth little to B since Article 9-and its requirement that the seller
make a reasonable effort to obtain a fair price for the goods-ostensibly
does not govern foreclosure of non-consensual liens. 9 The pre-Code
law authorizing sheriff's sales will often allow C to purchase the mer-
chandise for a nominal bid. Moreover, the sale may extinguish B's in-
terest, leaving him with only the meager proceeds of the sale and the
unattractive prospect of collecting a deficiency judgment against A. 59
Authorities have divided over the proper interpretation of Section
9-311, but fortunately none has left B in this totally untenable position.
So far three interpretations have appeared. The interpretation least
favorable to B stems from an Oklahoma amendment to Section 9-311
which clearly indicates that C can compel a sheriffs sale.c B has some
protection insomuch as the sale does not extinguish his security interest.
According to an opinion issued by the Attorney General of Oklahoma,
the sheriff must conduct the sale without turning the proceeds over to
the secured party.,' Apparently the sheriff should also inform the
purchaser that he is taking the goods subject to a lien which B may
55. UCC § 9-311 provides:
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferraed (by
way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment, levy, garnidment or other
judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting
any transfer or making the transfer constitute a default.
56. UCC § 9-311, Comment 2 raises the procedural problem but suggests no definitive
solution. The Comment merely states:
This Section changes those rules [relating to title] by providing that in all security
interests the debtor's interest in the collateral remains subject to claims of creditors
who take appropriate action. It is left to the law of each state to determine the
form of "appropriate process."
57. UCC §§ 9-501 to 9-507.
58. UCC §§ 9-102, Comment on Purposes & Comment 1, 9-104(b)-(d), (h).
59. UCC § 9-504(2).
60. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A, § 9-311 (1963). The amendment adds to Section 9-311 the
following provision:
[B]ut the interest so transferred is subject to the creditor's security interest if it is
properly perfected, and nothing stated herein shall be construed to be inconsistent
with 21 O.S., § 1834.
61. Opinion of the Attorney General of Oklahoma No. 66-245 (July 28, 1956), as
reported at 3 UCC RE. SEr. 1004.
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thereafter enforce. This solution not only violates Article 9's policy
against perfected security interests with less than full effect against
the claims of subsequent lienors,62 it also leaves B to pursue his interest
in the collateral against a stranger to the security agreement.03
Furthermore, construing Section 9-311 to authorize C's disposal of
the collateral at a sheriff's sale takes from B the right which Section
9-306 gives him to repossess collateral from anyone to whom A has
transferred it without authorization.64 Only a narrow reading of 9-311,
permitting C to levy not on the collateral itself, but on A's equity in it,
avoids a conflict between the two sections. The broader Oklahoma in-
terpretation creates a dear inconsistency within Article 9-a fact which
undermines its cogency.
A second interpretation of Section 9-311 would allow C to force a
sale of the collateral, but require the sale to meet the standards of coin-
mercial reasonableness imposed by Article 9's default provisions.05 A
conceptual problem lurks here because Article 9 does not purport to
cover non-consensual liens.66 Apart from this, the interpretation makes
sense for two reasons. First, since Article 9 creates C's right to reach A's
equity, it is reasonable that Article 9's standards should govern this
right.67 Second, B should enjoy the same foreclosure procedure he would
have had to follow-a procedure designed in part to protect A's other
secured creditors. No court which has faced the issue, however, has yet
accepted this interpretation and boldly hurdled the conceptual barrier
to bringing the enforcement of non-consensual liens within the ambit
of Article 9.8
62. See UCC §§ 9-201, -301.
63. In order to recover from the purchaser, B apparently would be required to comply
with the tracing provisions of UCO § 9-306. See p. 1554 supra.
64. See p. 1554 supra.
65. UCO §§ 9-504(1), (3).
66. See p. 1555 supra.
67. See UCC § 9-504(3).
68. Oblique authority for this interpretation is found in Bloom v. Hilty, 210 Pa. Super.
255, 232 A.2d 26, rev'd on other grounds, 427 Pa. 463, 234 A.2d 860 (1967) and in In re
Dennis Mitchell Indus. Inc., 280 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968). In both these cases the
court reached its decision by considering Article 9's default provisions. Neither of their
holdings is applicable, but their reasoning sheds light on the Section 9-311 problem.
In Bloom the court upheld the right of a judgment creditor to levy upon and sell
collateral subject to a perfected security, basing its decision on Sections 9-501 and 9-504,
which deal with a secured party's rights following his debtor's default. 210 Pa. Super. at
261, 264, 232 A.2d at 30, 32. The court was in error in citing these Sections without ex-
plaining its position because Article 9 does not govern the enforcement of non-consensual
liens. See p. 1555 supra. A possible reading of the case, however, is that any foreclosure
on goods subject to a security interest is to be governed by the default provisions of
Article 9 whether or not the foreclosing party is the holder of a consensual lien.
Support for this reading is found in the Mitchell case, a proceeding in bankruptcy.
There a secured party filed a reclamation petition against a purchaser of equipment who
bought at the trustee's judicial sale. The question was whether the rights of the put-
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The third interpretation reads Section 9-311 narrowly to say that C
only acquires rights in the collateral by his levy and that B cannot bar
C from obtaining his due. B, however, would control the liquidation
sale. Coogan's analysis of 9-311,6 9 which suggests this interpretation,
turns on the draftsmen's purpose in including the section, which was
designed merely to make dear that the Code's general rejection of title
as a test for determining rights of parties1 ° also applied here."' Permit-
ting C to enforce his interest while leaving B in control of the collateral
serves this limited purpose by preserving the rights of both parties in
fair proportion.72 At the same time, it reconciles C's rights under 9-311
with those of B under the rest of Article 9-and especially under Sec-
tion 9-306.73 Finally, this procedure ensures management of the liquida-
tion to the party whose right to possession matured first. B could then
protect himself by providing in the security agreement that the attach-
ment of C's lien constituted a default, giving him an immediate right
of possession74 and the advantage of controlling any subsequent disposi-
tion of the collateral.
No matter which interpretation of Section 9-311 ultimately prevails
in the courts, B cannot prevent C from, at a minimum, forcing him to
foreclose a chattel mortgage-type security interest at C's whim. The
field pledge device does not avoid this danger, but it does protect B
against a dissipation of the collateral and its proceeds by A. Provided
chaser were to be governed by Section 2-403(1). In granting the petition the court
adopted a "nature of the sale" test and held that since the rights of a secured party
were at issue, the purchaser's rights would be determined by the Article 9 standards,
apparently referring to Section 9-504(4). 280 F. Supp. at 436.
If the reasoning in these cases is applied to Section 9.311, it would mean that C may
compel a sale of the collateral but that the sale would be governed by the standards of
Section 9-504.
69. 1 COOGAN § 8.02, at 867-68.
70. UCC § 9-202.
71. UCC § 9-311, Comment 1.
72. See the distribution provisions in UCC § 9-504(1).
73. See p. 1556 supra.
74. UCC § 9-503 1 Comment. See William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess & Leigh, Ltd., 52
Misc. 2d 821, 276 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1967). There the court granted a secured party's petition
for vacation of an execution levy. The decision rested on Section 9-503, rather than on
Section 9-311, but its reasoning applies to the Section 9-311 problem as well. The court
held that the secured party's right to possession matured immediately upon the debtor's
default and that the judgment creditor's levy could not subordinate that right. "[T]he
right to possession and sale of the collateral... passed from the Debtor to the petitioner
at the time of default. Whether or not the Debtor had such rights at ti time the levy
was made, the Debtor did not have them after default, and the levy is ineffective to
transfer such right." Id. at 829, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 663. The case is striking in that It upholds
the secured party's right to possession even though the levy occurred prior to the debtor's
default Id. at 823, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 660. This is contrary to the temporal element oE Section
9-503. See 2 Gn--soRE § 43.3, at 1191-93. Nevertheless, the case stands as good authority for
the proposition that a levying creditor cannot preempt the secured party's right to pos-
session once default has occurred.
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the release procedures are handled properly, A cannot gain access to the
inventory until he has paid a portion of his debt. In operation the field
pledge is much the same as B's reselling the inventory to A on a cash
basis. Moreover, B can use the field pledge to ensure that C does not
acquire possession of the collateral and control over its liquidation.
Once again, B would have to stipulate in the security agreement that
the attachment of C's lien constitutes default.75 Under a pledge ar-
rangement, however, upon default B's status automatically shifts from
that of a holder of the collateral under Section 9-207 to that of a holder
under Section 9-503.71 B need not notify either A or C of his intention
to hold under Section 9-503 in order for his right to dispose of the col-
lateral under Sections 9-501 and 9-504 to become operative." As in the
non-possessory context, Section 9-311 compels B to liquidate at C's
whim, but, theoretically at least, C cannot assert a right to possession-
and hence a right to control the liquidation-superior to that of B, who
has possession from the first.
III. Cost and Inconvenience
After weighing the need for speedy perfection against the risk in-
herent in surrendering direct control over the collateral and proceeds,
B must consider a third factor-the cost and inconvenience involved in
implementing each of the devices. In the hypothetical A owes B $4,000,
a debt large enough to warrant a significant expenditure of time and
money to secure. With a smaller debt, employing one of the more ex-
pensive devices would approach what Gilmore refers to as hunting
mosquitoes with a cannon.7 8 A creditor in B's position should estimate
whether securing the debt he holds would repay converting A's store-
room into a warehouse and hiring an agent to manage the warehouse
before he elected to take a field pledge. If he contemplated a bulk trans-
fer, he should calculate the cost and inconvenience of complying with
the Article 6 notice requirements79 and of finding a way to dispose of
the merchandise once the transfer had been completed. When the debt
75. See note 51 supra,
76. UCO § 9-503, Comment compels this conclusion. The Comment states in pertinent
part: "Under this Article the secured party's right to possession of the collateral (if lie Is
not already in possession as pledgee) accrues on default'. See the discussion of the
Iselin case, note 74 supra.
77. Part 5 imposes a notice requirement on B only at the time he decides how and
when to conduct the liquidation. UCC § 9-504(3); 2 GILMoa § 44.1, at 1213.
78. Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 538 (1948).
79. See p. 1549 & notes 17-20 supra.
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is small, expense alone may render these devices uneconomical, leaving
only the relatively inexpensive chattel mortgage as a viable alternative.
The absolute cost of implementing each device is not the sole con-
sideration, however; B should also consider cost in relation to the
amount of security the device affords. For instance, the chattel mort-
gage is the easiest and least expensive to perfect s0 Nevertheless, where
A's predicament is critical, the cost of policing A's disposition of tie
collateral and proceeds might outweigh the protective value of the de-
vice."' In such cases setting up a field pledge may be cheaper in the long
run. Even a bulk transfer would be less expensive if A eventually went
bankrupt and B, even as a secured creditor, would have to participate
in the proceedings.8 2
On the other hand, when A's problems are likely temporary, a bulk
transfer may force B to pay for more security than he needs. Not only is
a bulk transfer expensive to negotiate, it also leaves B the onerous task
of liquidating the merchandise. Unless he maintains a retail outlet of
his own, he may have no way to sell the goods except in bulk to a sur-
plus merchandise dealer or at auction. The distress prices he can expect
from such a sale reduces his chances of getting the benefit of his bar-
gain on the total transaction. 3 Whenever A can survive the decline, B
will usually find it most economical to allow him to sell the merchandise
in the ordinary course of business at retail prices.
80. See note 40 supra. See also UCC §§ 9-203, 9-204(1), 9-302(1), 9-402.
81. See p. 1554 supra.
82. Even if B's participation is no more than filing a reclamation petition for the
collateral or defending against the trustee's action to avoid his security interest as a
preference, his litigation expenses may be significant.
83. The techniques that B might employ to liquidate merchandise transferred to him
in bulk are beyond the scope of this Note. The problem is mentioned here only to indi-
cate a cost factor that B should consider in choosing an appropriate device.
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